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Director's Choice: The Fine Line Between
Interpretation and Infringement of an Author's Work
by JON GARON*
Wanted: Set designer for production of Samuel Beckett's "Endgame."
All designs must conform to those of original production. Bring resume
and sketches to ....
There is a new trend developing in American theatre. As the num-
ber of new productions continues to dwindle,1 there is an ever-in-
creasing emphasis on revivals and transfers from London's West
End,2 both in New York and throughout the country.' The theatre
industry is being forced to place greater reliance on non-original pro-
ductions, basing financial solvency on the success of these produc-
tions. Two techniques have proven successful to promote this type of
theatre. The first method is to create a slavish reproduction of the
original. The second is to recast the original production with differ-
ent types of performers in new settings, and try to overlay a new in-
terpretation on the original text.'
Both of these techniques serve their purpose in that they sell tick-
ets, but each brings a unique set of problems. For the authors and
creators of the original work, a new interpretation may alter or dam-
age the play they developed. Alternatively, exacting reproductions
may result in recreating the work of designers and choreographers
* J.D. Candidate 1988, Columbia University School of Law. Managing Director of the
New Cornet Theatre, London in 1983. Author of "The Paleontologist," premiered at the
Riverwest Theatre, New York City, Sept. 30, 1987. Associate at Shea & Gould, Los Angeles,
beginning Autumn 1988. Copyright © Jon Garon 1988.
1. In 1986 there were only three successful new shows which were originally produced on
Broadway: Neil Simon's "Broadway Bound," "Social Security," a vehicle for Marlo Thomas,
and Lily Tomlin's one-woman show "The Search for Signs of Intelligent Life in the Uni-
verse." Furthermore, the 1985-86 season was the lowest grossing season since 1980 and in-
cluded the fewest number of productions in over 40 years. Year-end Report, Variety, June 4,
1986, at 132-33.
2. The West End is the London analog to Broadway. It is the center of commercial thea-
tre in England.
3. According to Variety's year-end report, the 1985-86 season included four revivals and
four transfers from the West End. Year-end Report, supra note 1, at 132-33.
4. See generally S. Langley, Theatre Management in America (2d ed. 1980).
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without their receiving any compensation or having the ability to
control the production.
This Note shall examine the problems of non-original productions
and suggest some techniques which will protect both the original pro-
ductions and the artists who created them. Part I will analyze the
balance between the author's need for protection and the interests of
the theatrical community at large. Part II will look at the availability
and effectiveness of judicial intervention. Finally, Part III will look at
industry practices and discuss whether effective contract drafting will
help to alleviate the potential conflict between author and theatrical
community.
I. Balancing the Interests
A. Protection for the First Production
Under the Copyright Act of 1976, a playwright is guaranteed the
right to reproduce and perform his work." This guarantees the artist
absolute control over where and when his dramatic work is per-
formed. There are no compulsory licenses for the theatre; no one
can perform the playwright's material without first gaining permis-
sion from the playwright or his agent.6 Typically, when a play is first
performed, the author is actively involved in the production. The
standard agreement for Dramatists Guild members under the Ap-
proved Production Contract ("APC") does not require a playwright
to be reasonable in refusing to make any changes, and it ensures that
no changes can be made without the author's approval.' Although
the producer or director may wish to make the changes, the APC is
explicit that nothing other than reason and patience can be used to
make the author modify his work in any way. 8
The underlying policy for this absolute prohibition is quite clear:
5. 17 U.S.C. § 106(l), (4) (1982).
6. A compulsory license is a statutory requirement that a work be made available at a set
price. Examples include: Id. § 1 11(d) (compulsory license for secondary transmissions by
cable systems); Id. § 115 (compulsory license for phonorecords); and Id. § 116 (compulsory
license for juke-boxes).
7. Sections 8.01(b) and 8.01(c) of the APC illustrate the author's absolute power. Under
the terms of the contract, the producer can complain to the Dramatists Guild that the author
is being unreasonable. If the Guild accepts that the claim is appropriate, it will appoint some-
one to try to convince the author to make the required changes, but the Guild "shall have no
power to compel Author to agree to such change." APC § 8.01(c). The APC is the official,
binding agreement which all playwrights who are members of the Dramatists Guild must use.
In theory, this is the only contract under which a Dramatists Guild member can work on
Broadway.
8. APC § 8.01(c).
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INTERPRETATION AND INFRINGEMENT
the failure of an initial production (particularly in New York City)
will often foreclose the possibility of a second production and the op-
portunity for publication of the script. To protect the author's inter-
est in the subsidiary value of his work, it is important that the initial
presentation be as close to the author's intent as any performance
can be.10 Because the producer"' has contracted away influence over
the author's work, 2 there is no interest as compelling as the author's
in the initial production. No form of balancing test need be contem-
plated; protection must be given to the author.
B. The Policy of Protection: For whose benefit?
Once a play has been published and is no longer being produced
with hopes of a profitable New York City run, the economic incen-
tive of protecting the integrity of an author's work begins to dimin-
ish. No longer will a single poor production signal the demise of the
play's viability. A poor review in Denver will not effect the market in
Dallas. An unreviewed school production cannot change the attitudes
of those who did not attend. As the economic need to protect the
play diminishes, the reasons for protection and the type of protection
may also change. Is it enough to protect the author's artistic vision
simply because the play was the author's creation and should not be
subject to manipulation without consent?
1. The Interests of the Author
When determining the scope of protection for authors, one should
understand what protection actually encompasses. The Copyright
Act generally protects the "economic" rights of an author in his
work." "The copyright laws seek to protect economic, rather than
non-economic interests. They focus on the right of the individual to
reap the reward of his endeavors and hav[e] little to do with protect-
ing feelings or reputation.""
9. National Educational Theatre Conference, Aug. 17, 1986 (statement of Richard
Romagnoli of the New York Theatre Studio) [hereinafter NETC].
10. Id.
11. The producer is the individual with the most immediate financial interest in the suc-
cess of the production and presumably would want to protect his financial stake in the origi-
nal production.
12. See supra note 7.
13. Damich, The New York Artists' Authorship Rights Act: A Comparative Critique, 84
Colum. L. Rev. 1733, 1734 (1984).
14. Note, A Constitutional Analysis of Copyrighting Government-Commissioned Work,
84 Colum. L. Rev. 425, 442 (1984) (citing Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433
U.S. 562, 574 (1977)).
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In other countries, the doctrine of droit moral or "moral rights"
protects artistic work as an extension of the author's personality, in-
dependent of the author's property interests. 1 Every work is the ex-
pression of the author"6 and as such the author has a personal inter-
est in protecting the expression from mutilation, alteration or
defacement.1 " To damage or change a work of art would be a form
of mutilation, and hence neither legal nor ethical.1 8 Because the per-
sonal rights are not included in the bundle of rights granted under
the 1976 Copyright Act, droit moral protection for the performing
arts has generally not been accepted in the United States.1 9
Though the doctrine is not law here, the values of droit moral
should not be ignored when analyzing the amount of leeway other
artists should be allowed in interpreting a script. There is a potential
disincentive for authors who know that they will one day lose the
power to protect their scripts from unauthorized interpretation.2
The fear that others will add messages contrary to the views of the
author or make a play stand for a political view that the author op-
poses may be enough to keep some gifted writers from utilizing the
15. Note, The New York Artists' Authorship Rights Act: Increased Protection and En-
hanced Status for Visual Artists, 70 Cornell L. Rev. 158, 160 (1984).
16. See Stella v. Mazoh, slip op. No. 07585-82 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 1, 1982) (cited in
Note, supra note 15, at 166).
17. Note, supra note 15, at 162. These are elements of "the right of integrity." Id. Al-
though moral rights comprise more than just integrity, it is this right which is at issue in
disputes over interpretation.
18. See Ladas, International Protection of Literary and Artistic Property (1938). For an
excellent overview on the moral right of integrity, see Tackaberry, Look What They've Done
to My Song: The Songwriter's Moral Right of Integrity in Canada and the United States,
Seminar in Copyright Law, Columbia University (1986) (available through Columbia-VLA
Journal of Law & the Arts).
19. Note, supra note 15, at 159. See also Note, supra note 14, at 443. There have been
some state statutes which give a degree of protection analogous to droit moral. The California
Art Preservation Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 987 (West 1982 & Supp. 1984), and the New York
Artists' Authorship Act, ch. 994, 1983 N.Y. Laws 1933, codified at N.Y. Arts & Cult. Aff.
Law § 314.59 (McKinney 1984) were the first two such statutes. These offer no comfort to
the theatrical artists, however, since neither statute offers protection to the performing arts.
See Note, supra note 15, at 173.
20. See Leonide Zorine et VAAP c./ Le Lucernaire et SACD, Nov. 27, 1985, reprinted
in Tribunal De Grande Instance De Paris, at 166. From December 12, 1983 to February 4,
1984, a play written by the Russian Leonide Zorine was performed in France under the di-
rection of Bogdan Berciu. An injunction was initially sought by VAAP, the Soviet author's
rights organization; it was denied on February 2, 1984. The second action alleged total disfig-
uration of the work, including text, direction, set and costumes. In particular, the elements of
the set and direction betrayed the spirit of the comedy and created political overtones not in
the original. Although the run of the production was already complete, the court did award
the injunction to the playwright and the Soviet organization. There is little real protection
for the author, however, when the injunction is granted after the run.
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theatrical medium. Changes that do not reverse, but merely dull the
pointed view of an author may likewise be sufficient to discourage
potential writers from the theatre.
Nevertheless, even if the effect is occasionally sufficient to dissuade
an author from writing for the theatre, the author should have to
accept this potentially damaging burden because the author's integ-
rity is not the only value at stake. The need for protection of the
author's artistic vision must be balanced against the need for the cre-
ative work of others in the production of the work and the public's
interest in new insights built on the familiar work. These other pri-
orities are embodied in the process of artistic interpretation. In any
theatrical production, the creative work of many artists, not only the
author, is at stake.
2. The Interests of the Contributing Artists
The director's role in bringing the proper elements to a produc-
tion, staging those elements and creating an artistic view is often the
decisive factor in the quality of a production. Directors often receive
the credit for a successful production and almost always receive the
blame for a poor one. Casting a production, usually completed before
the first rehearsal takes place, will often determine the eventual suc-
cess of a production."
For the choreographer, the 1976 Copyright Act finally established
choreography as a separate, protectible work.22 Section 102(a)(4) spe-
cifically includes "pantomimes and choreographic works" as the
proper subject of copyright.2 As a result, the choreographer, unlike
the other artists involved in a collaboration, does have an ownership
interest in the finished product. What happens to this material will be
determined by the contracts under which the choreographer was
21. The model of collaborative excellence can be found in the 1939 production of "Julius
Caesar." Director Orson Welles and the Mercury Theatre's staging of Shakespeare's histori-
cal drama became a tremendous Broadway success by using modern dress to create a theatri-
cal comment on fascism. See O.G. Brockett, History of the Theatre 629 (4th ed. 1982). Suc-
cess of the production being generally attributed to the creative genius of Welles, how
profound was the input of the costume designer?
22. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(4) (1982). See Comment, The Different Art: Choreography &
Copyright, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 1442 (1986). While this review of copyright and choreography
is very interesting, it bases much of it review of the current law on Horgan v. MacMillan, 621
F. Supp. 1169 (S.D.N.Y 1985), the suit brought on behalf of the Balanchine estate for an
alleged copyright infringement of his "Nutcracker" ballet. Horgan has since been reversed by
the Second Circuit, 789 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1986). The full impact of this decision on choreog-
raphy is not the subject of this Note.
23. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(4) (1982).
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hired. How fully a choreographer will be protected by the courts has
yet to be resolved.2'
The set designer's role is to create an atmosphere which may pro-
foundly affect the audience. The setting can make an otherwise un-
workable play come to life, or cause a perfectly fine piece of writing
to flounder out of place. In addition to any artistic control a set de-
signer may command as painter, architect and sculptor, he may add
to a story the realism that creates credibility or the vision which al-
lows an unbelievable story of the supernatural suddenly to come
alive.
The actor gives to his own character a depth, background and vi-
tality that can turn the most trite stock character into something
human or superhuman. The interaction between actors may suddenly
create a moment on stage where the audience becomes involved and
which never had meaning before. A look, a gesture or a tone of voice
can change the meaning of the author's written word, making it seem
unimaginative and trite or soar with poetry and beauty. While an au-
24. Horgan will likely be the most influential case on choreography infringement both
because of its straightforward, well-reasoned analysis of the problem and because of the lack
of other cases on this issue. Reversing the district court, the Second Circuit stated that "the
standard for determining copyright infringement is not whether the original could be recre-
ated from the allegedly infringing copy, but whether the latter is 'substantially similar' to the
former." 789 F.2d at 162. At issue was an unauthorized book of photographs showing
George Balanchine's "Nutcracker Ballet." The book, written by Ellen Switzer, includes sixty
color photographs from the New York City Ballet Company production of the Nutcracker as
well as black and white photos of Balanchine and the company off-stage. Id. at 158-59.
As now articulated by the Second Circuit, the question is whether the use of the photo-
graphs is sufficient in quantity and sequencing to be substantially similar to the original pro-
duction as copyrighted by Balanchine. Id. at 162-63. Balanchine had satisfied the fixation and
deposit requirements for the dance by depositing a videotape of the production in 1981. Id at
158. The court gives no indication of what constitutes enough substantial similarity to prove
infringement between the photographs and the underlying dances, however, so the extent to
which choreographers may borrow or steal from each other is not clear.
The court strongly discourages any test which includes looking to whether the original
could be reproduced from the copy. Speaking about the transition of a story from novel to
film, the court states that "[e]ven a small amount of the original, if it is qualitatively signifi-
cant, may be sufficient to be an infringement, although the full original could not be recre-
ated from the excerpt." Id. at 162. Following this logic it seems that even recreating a small
portion of the dance from "Big Spender" originally choreographed by Bob Fosse could be a
copyright infringement, as the number is so significant to the overall choreography of "Sweet
Charity."
If enforced in this manner, the legion of former dancers who attempt a livelihood by recre-
ating original choreography for revivals and amateur productions may suddenly find them-
selves working outside of the law. Thus, the 1976 Act and Horgan help to diminish, though
not eliminate, the practice of dancers and dance captains advertising themselves as able to
reproduce the original choreography. There has yet to be a case litigated where a dancer was
sued for re-using a dance, though this new statute may help to discourage such abuse. See
generally Comment, supra note 22.
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thor can never fully control the actors on stage, no matter what his
involvement, an author who includes a stage direction in the text as-
sumes that it will be followed. An actor who respects these directions
will give a very different performance than one who disregards them.
An actor would claim that he needs the artistic flexibility to choose
when and how to use these stage directions.
Additionally, depending on the unique mix of personalities and
creative talent in any given production, the role of the lighting de-
signer, costume designer, sound designer, properties administrator or
stage manager may become the interpretative vision which separates
the particular production from every other production of the play.
The nature of the theatrical process necessitates the need for creative
interaction and some degree of interpretation on all levels.
3. The Interests of the Audience
The interests of the audience must also be kept in mind. The pur-
pose of copyright is "to promote the progress of science and useful
arts.""
The purpose of federal copyright protection is to benefit the public by
encouraging works in which it is interested. To induce individuals to
undertake the personal sacrifices necessary to create such works, federal
copyright law extends to the authors of such works a limited monopoly
to reap the rewards of their endeavors.26
This purpose may be lost if protection is overbroad. There is no
question that the audience has an interest in seeing a play as the play-
wright intended it be performed. Productions faithful to the author's
vision, however, will not be eliminated by a system which also allows
interpretative, deviant productions. The audience has an interest in
seeing both accurate reproductions and new interpretations. There is
a need to hear the current political or social thought of the director
as well as that of the author. A very interesting message might be
created if, for example, a production of Arthur Miller's "The Cruci-
ble" dressed the witches' accusers in Ku Klux Klan robes. It is argua-
ble that the audience's exposure to new political discourse should not
be determined by the wishes of Mr. Miller. Instead the audience has
25. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
26. Baltimore Orioles v. Major League Baseball Players, 805 F.2d 663, 678 (7th Cir.
1986) (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)), cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 1593 (1987). See also Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S.
151, 156 (1975); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286
U.S. 123, 127 (1932).
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the power to decide on the value of the alternative interpretation
through their attendance and subsequent comments. 1
This less restrictive view of protection might better serve the pur-
pose of copyright as embodied in the United States Constitution, but
it may also be at odds with any "moral rights" an author may possess
in his work.
4. The Interests of the Theatre
The need for interpretation may be a result of the type of produc-
tion and type of theatre performing the play. For example, a play
performed in a university setting needs a great deal of artistic flexi-
bility because the interpretative process is an educational experience
for the students involved in the production. The sole purpose of the
production is not necessarily to present the author's play to the audi-
ence. One purpose is to teach students how to use a script. The pro-
duction is for the student learning to develop a character from a text,
for the student learning to add visual meaning to the text or for the
student learning to find action in the text. The script is a vehicle to
teach communication and the skills necessary to the art of theatre.
The audience is involved to rate the result, give feedback to the stu-
dents and encourage the learning process.
The typical community theatre has as its primary mission bringing
well known works into the community, and therefore may have little
need for great artistic license. It is less concerned about interpreta-
tion than access.28 As a result, artistic decisions may be based on prac-
tical necessity, rather than artistic integrity. The availability of re-
sources, performers and appropriate technical ability may determine
artistic decisions.29 If modifications are not allowed, the result may be
a production which serves neither the artist nor the community.
27. The popular productions may be the only ones which survive in a competitive market-
place for the audience. It is equally possible, however, that a poorly attended production will
be the one creating the greatest critical interest or controversy. Theatre important to history
and political development need not be highly prized. So long as it encourages further discus-
sion and development, it has served some purpose.
28. For a typical explanation of these goals, see Drama League of America, Work with
Amateurs (Mar. 1914) (available at the Lincoln Center Branch of the New York Public
Library).
29. The Drama League of America analyzed the problems for amateur organizations as
follows:
Or to take the problems of staging: scenery, lighting, costumes, make-up, proper-
ties. For all these essential matters the conditions of the amateur are altogether
different from those of the professional stage. . . . The only guiding principle
which most amateur experimenters can have is to imitate, in a cheap and makeshift
fashion, the elaborate effects of the professional stage. But the old hand learns,
[Vol. 12:277
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Touring companies of professional productions face this problem
daily. The inappropriarte decision to conform the touring production
to the Broadway production may result in financially untenable behe-
moths which act an injustice upon producers, artists and audiences
alike. Alternatively, an inappropriate decision to limit the touring
production by reducing the number of sets, costume changes or pro-
duction numbers may result in a sub-standard production that is
equally unpleasant to producers, audiences and artists. Under the
APC, the only acceptable contract for authors who are members of
the Dramatists Guild, the author must approve any decision to main-
tain the original production or modify the touring company produc-
tion.80 So long as the author is still actively involved with a produc-
tion, he may ensure that the developmental process follows an
appropriate path.
The decisions which may mean success or failure to a production
are closely controlled in the professional world by the author. As a
practical matter, authors cannot easily control amateur productions
of their work. While the professional touring company benefits from
the author's oversight, the financial base of amateur or professional
regional theatres is often not sufficient to include the necessary salary
for the author, assuming he wished to become involved. The artistic
decisions which are made in such a production often go unnoticed by
the author. For example, a high school drama coach may know it is
wrong to delete material from a script, but he also knows that the
audience cannot sit for three hours. He directs accordingly, cutting
the script to a manageable length, ignoring the warning on the cover
of his rented script and violating the copyright. The director believes
that this transgression is a necessary evil in school productions.
Beyond the typical infringement of the author's right to prevent
alteration of the text, there are many artistic decisions that occur
daily which are often not considered to violate the author's copy-
right. Both amateur and professional directors feel completely free to
add the interpretive style of their own artistic staff to each produc-
tion. Because any interpretative act is a deviation from the original
work, however, it may be a violation of the author's rights. It can be
after painful experience, that this is neither wise nor necessary. Many plays, of
course, which demand elaborate setting, are quite impossible for amateur use, no
matter how simple their problems or interpretation. But on the other hand, plays
which on the professional stage are presented elaborately can often be done by
amateurs in a simpler way, inexpensively, with excellent effect.
Id. at 7.
30. See APC § 11.3.
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argued that the playwright, not the lawmakers or trade associations,
should have the final authority on just which modifications can be
made. The courts have yet to decide this question, however, because
no playwright has brought a case to trial alleging improper interpre-
tation of his script." The production of Samuel Beckett's "Endg-
ame" by the American Repertory Theatre ("ART") in Cambridge,
Massachusetts, involved the first production dispute to come close to
litigation.
3 2
II. Bringing an Action: Which Claims May Succeed
A. Background: The War over Interpretation
In December 1984, ART purchased rights to produce Beckett's
"Endgame." There was no dispute over the dialogue in the script
because ART made few changes. The problems arose when ART
chose to add an overture written by Philip Glass,33 to have two char-
acters performed by black rather than white actors, 4 and to change
the setting from Beckett's gray room with two windows to an aban-
doned subway tunnel after the holocaust.3 5 Beckett asserted that
these changes constituted a violation of his rights as author and
sought an injunction to prevent the production from being staged.3
31. This author has not been able to find a single case litigated. No such case is reported
on either Westlaw or Lexis.
32. Gussow, Enter Fearless Director, Pursued by Playwright, N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1985, at
C14. The article also discusses a similar battle over the Wooster Group's production of
"L.S.D.," a new play which originally included a twenty minute segment of Arthur Miller's
"The Crucible." While a similar debate has emerged on the rights of the director to adapt an
author's play, the Wooster Group situation is distinguishable because they were specifically
denied the use of Miller's work. The arguments in favor of granting the Wooster Group
access therefore do not hinge on the proper role of interpretation, but on the scope of the
fair use doctrine as codified at 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
33. Freedman, Associates of Beckett Seek to Halt Production, N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1984,
at A 14: "Representatives of the playwright Samuel Beckett are seeking to halt the production
of 'Endgame' . . . contend[ing] that the theater is distorting Mr. Beckett's play by changing
its setting from a bare cell-like room to a subway tunnel and by using an overture by the
composer Philip Glass."
34. Freedman, Actor's Equity Protests Beckett Cast Criticism, N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1985,
at C17. Barney Rosset, the agent and publisher for Beckett, sent a letter dated Dec. 10, 1984
to ART delineating his client's problems with the production. According to the article,
"'[two of the actors are purposefully black,' Mr. Rosset wrote in a list of complaints about
the production. He went on to contend that the production 'wants us to know about miscege-
nation . . . .'" Actors' Equity Association responded to a grievance filed against Mr. Rosset
for the letter with a non-binding resolution stating that the union "strongly abhors any sug-
gestion that nontraditional casting is inappropriate in Mr. Beckett's 'Endgame.' " Id.
35. Freedman, Playwrights Debate Staging, N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1985, at C21.
36. Id.
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Ultimately, ART and Beckett settled the dispute; Beckett was allowed
space in the program to disavow the production and explain his posi-
tion on the changes.37
, While the settlement was satisfactory for Beckett and ART, the
rest of the theatre industry still has no definitive answer as to where
the judicial line will be drawn and what degree of interpretation will
be deemed legal. The filing of a suit would be enough to force many
small theatre companies to abandon hopes of an innovative produc-
tion due to the prohibitive cost of litigation.3" Small theatre produc-
ers often see their choice as either making no artistic modifications,
thereby letting the production become a flawed, stagnant Broadway
reproduction, or making modifications and possibly incurring civil li-
ability which could destroy the theatre company. 9 For the author the
choice is whether to allow numerous productions which may be
flawed, and thus ruin the value of the play in that area, or to main-
tain control over subsidiary production rights and severely limit the
exposure and income generated by the work. Further, if an author
chooses to bring suit against an offensive production, he faces a
shortage of legal doctrines to support his claim.
B. The Search for the Appropriate Theory
1. The Copyright Act: The Extent of Protection
The standard claim against an offensive production would be a
claim of copyright infringement. If the Grand Rapids Theatre En-
semble attempted to produce "Nebraska!," a thinly veiled perform-
37. Freedman, "Endgame" Opens in Wake of Pact, N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1984, at C14.
38. Martin Garbus, the attorney representing Beckett in the action against ART, com-
mented "that he felt the out-of-court settlement would dissuade other theaters from veering
from Mr. Beckett's text and stage directions for 'Endgame.' " Id. There is no reason to as-
sume the effect of the settlement will be limited to "Endgame" or the works of Mr. Beckett.
The effect will be felt throughout the theatrical community.
39. This should not imply that every interpretation succeeds. The critique of the ART's
"Endgame" in Theatre, the journal of the Yale School of Drama, had this to say of Douglas
Stein's interpretive setting:
As a visual composition, this stage picture is breathtaking. Theatricality, however,
is not the main issue and cannot suffice as an evaluative standard. The real question
is whether the design serves the play. The problem with specific interpretations of
Beckett is that they become reductive, cutting off differing approaches in meaning
to the text . . ..
If the script of "Endgame" is performed intact, as it is at ART, this indetermi-
nacy is not affected by simply changing the setting. Beckett's words preserve the
essential ambiguity, and the action still occurs simultaneously in both a metaphori-
cal present and a hypothetical future, just as it does when the stage directions are
followed to the letter.
Kalb, The Underground Endgame, Theatre, Apr. 1985, at 89-90.
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ance of Rogers and Hammerstein's "Oklahoma!," the theatre cer-
tainly would be liable for copyright infringement."0 Because the
performance would be unauthorized, the current copyright holders
of "Oklahomal" could enjoin the production, sue for damages (statu-
tory or actual, depending on the value of the claim), and seek reason-
able attorneys' fees."' The Copyright Act defines an infringer as
"[a]nyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright
owner as provided by sections 106 through 118."' Section 106(4)
guarantees the right "to perform the copyrighted work publicly." In
the hypothetical, the theatre company clearly violated the copyright
owner's right to perform the work and is liable for damages.
In the Beckett situation, the questions change slightly. Is the
description of the set protected by copyright? If it is, has the license
for use of the description been paid? Or can the play be performed
without the specified staging (and does this reduce the licensing fee)?
While these are basically contractual questions, they hinge on
whether the stage directions and character descriptions are covered
by the copyright in the play.4'
The issue is discussed by the late Melville Nimmer in a section cov-
ering the copyrightability of "Jokes, 'Gags,' and other 'Stage
Business.' "
Although there is very little authority on the question, it would seem
that jokes, "gags" and other forms of "stage business" may claim copy-
right protection. . . .Such protection is, of course, limited to the "ex-
pression" and not the mere "idea." . . . Moreover, a mere imitation of
an actor portraying a role will not constitute copyright infringement if
no substantial literary material is copied, even, perhaps, if particular
"business" of actions are copied.'"
Legislative support for this position can be found in the 1966
House Report on an earlier version of the current Copyright Act. 46
40. See Chagares, Parody or Piracy: The Protective Scope of the Fair Use Defense to
Copyright Infringement Actions Regarding Parodies, 12 Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 229
(1988).
41. 17 U.S.C. §§ 502, 504, 505 (1982).
42. 17 U.S.C. § 501 (1982).
43. Protection for stage directions and character descriptions is by no means presumed
within the industry. See infra notes 94 and 118 and accompanying text.
44. 1 M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 2.13, at 2-178.2(1) (1987) (foot-
notes omitted) [hereinafter Nimmer on Copyright].
45. Copyright Law Revision, H.R. Rep. No. 2237, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) [hereinaf-
ter House Report].
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Under the heading "Categories of copyrightable works"" it was reported
that
Isleveral witnesses at the hearings recommended the specific enumera-
tion of additional categories of works in section 102, including . . .
works of stage directors .... .he committee concluded, however, that
to the extent these works constitute "original works of authorship"
under the statute, they are already included in section 102's list.4
Although the case law is quite thin in this area, there may be copy-
right protection available for original stage business and direction
brought to an existing work. The most poetic judicial statement in
support of the committee's conclusion can be found in the opinion of
Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp."' by Judge Learned Hand:
We have often decided that a play may be pirated without using the
dialogue. Were it not so, there could be no piracy of a pantomime,
where there cannot be any dialogue; yet nobody would deny to panto-
mime the name of drama. Speech is only a small part of a dramatist's
means of expression; he draws on all the arts and compounds his play
from words and gestures and scenery and costume and from the very
looks of the actors themselves. Again and again a play may lapse into
pantomime at its most poignant and significant moments; a nod, a move-
ment of the hand, a pause, may tell the audience more than words could
tell. To be sure, not all this is always copy-righted, though there is no
reason why it may not be . . ..
In Universal Pictures Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp.,60 the court similarly
rejected the copyright infringer's argument that the sequence in dis-
pute "is merely 'comic accretion' or consists merely of isolated 'gags'
and 'stage business,' and that material of that nature is not copyright-
able."'" The court insisted "that such material may be so combined
with events as to become subject to copyright protection. 61 2 Further,
the court offered the argument that the "means of expressing an idea
is subject to copyright protection, and where one uses his own
method or way of expressing his idea, such adornment constitutes a
protectible work. '"63
Although the court seemed to favor the creator of movement, the
court undermined both its own and Learned Hand's position. "It is
46. Id. at 45.
47. Id. at 46.
48. 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 669 (1936).
49. Id. at 55 (citations omitted).
50. 162 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1947).
51. Id. at 363.
52. Id.
53. Id. (emphasis in original).
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true that the mere motions, voice and postures of actors and mere
stage business is not subject of [sic] copyright protection." '' This ju-
dicial aside may explain the court's previous comment that such ma-
terial "so combined with events" may be copyrightable. Similar rea-
soning may also explain the basis of the general caveat in the House
Report that stage directions are protectible "to the extent these
works constitute 'original works of authorship.' " These qualifica-
tions may loom large indeed for any copyright claimant whose work
may not transcend mere motions, postures and stage business.
Perhaps the only assumption that should be drawn from these cases
is that there are copyrightable elements within a production that be-
long to the individual artists.56 Precisely what these elements are and
how well-defined they must be remain unclear, but this assumption
should make copyright the preeminent legal doctrine for protection
of the directions and movement embodied in a production.
The existence of some copyright protection should ensure that
when the initial set designer describes his set for the published script,
he is entitled to a royalty payment for each copy of the script sold
and for each stock production which is licensed. A choreographer's
work, since it often could stand as a performance without the original
work, should also be considered a separately copyrightable work.
Similarly, where an actor has contributed sufficiently to the interpreta-
tion of his character such that there is original material added to the
final production of the script, he should be able to expect a small
percentage of the royalties and license fees, though not directly from
a claim of copyright ownership. 57
54. Id.
55. House Report, supra note 45, at 46.
56. Copyrightability does not mean protection. Section 102 of the 1976 Act states that
"[clopyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title,,in original works of authorship
fixed in any tangible medium of expression .... " 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982) (emphasis added).
The fixation requirement may be met through the stage manager's "book" of the produc-
tion, an annotated script with every stage direction and lighting cue. It could also be met
through videotaping or filming the production. See Horgan v. Macmillan, 789 F.2d 157, 158
(2d Cir. 1986). If the original material is not fixed in some manner, there is no federal copy-
right protection available.
57. In Lugosi v. Universal Pictures Co., 160 Cal. Rptr. 323, 603 P.2d 425 (1979), the
widow and son of Bela Lugosi unsuccessfully sued Universal Pictures for the marketing pro-
ceeds from Lugosi's character in the 1930 film "Dracula." While the claim was based on the
"right of publicity" and the "right of privacy," the court's language was quite informative.
The majority wrote that
Lugosi could have created during his lifetime through the commercial exploitation
of his name, face and/or likeness in connection with the operation of any kind of
business or the sale of any kind of product or service a general acceptance and
good will for such business, product or service among the public, the effect of
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2. The Claim of Unfair Competition
In addition to the limited protection of copyright, a second cause
of action may provide an author some protection from unwanted in-
terpretation. An author could charge that the modified production
resulted in unfair competition between the original production and
subsequent, changed productions. Unfair competition may be found
when a product is sold so as to confuse or deceive the public and
make the consumer believe that the product sold is the same as the
original."
In the "Endgame" scenario, the logic of an unfair competition ac-
tion would be similar to the logic of the 1909 Copyright Act's "for
profit" distinction." Unauthorized performance of a nondramatic
work was an infringement if it was for profit. Dramatic works, how-
ever, did not receive this exemption, so that any unauthorized per-
formance of a dramatic work was an infringement. "It was reasoned
that if a dramatic work was performed . . . those who viewed such
performance were not likely to thereafter attend a performance...
of the same work." 60 If the performance were modified to the detri-
ment of the author, not only would he lose the audience that at-
tended the improper performance, but any negative responses to that
performance may result in diminished interest in the author's work.
The marketability of proper productions of the same work or en-
tirely different works by the same author could be damaged by the
renegade adaptation. It can be argued that by advertising the pro-
duction as Samuel Beckett's "Endgame," but instead presenting a
production that is not precisely what Beckett considers to be "Endg-
ame" due to the added music and the changes in the setting, this
which would have been to impress such business, product or service with a second-
ary meaning, protectable under the law of unfair competition.
Id. at 326, 603 P.2d at 428.
In his concurring opinion, however, Justice Mosk disagreed. "We are not troubled by the
nature of Lugosi's right to control the commercial exploitation of his likeness." Id. at 330,
603 P.2d at 432. (Mosk, J., concurring). Instead, Mosk was troubled by the possibility that an
actor could control the exploitation of his character's likeness. Mosk did "not suggest that an
actor can never retain a proprietary interest in a characterization. An original creation of a
fictional figure played exclusively by its creator may well be protectable." Id. (citations omit-
ted). Mosk saw a clear distinction between protection for a role originated by an actor
(Groucho Marx, Laurel and Hardy, Charlie Chaplin) and a role which is eventually synony-
mous with the actor (such as Charlton Heston's Moses). Although a court has never explicitly
based its decision on this original-character distinction, the language does often appear. Per-
haps it would serve as an effective distinction between original, protectible work and unpro-
tectible interpretation of existing work.
58. Fancy Free Mfg. Co. v. Fancy Free Fashions, Inc., 148 F. Supp. 825 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
59. Copyright Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 1(c), (e), 35 Stat. 1075.
60. 2 Nimmer on Copyright, supra note 44, § 8.15[A], at 8-144.3.
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production would damage Beckett's opportunity to stage a proper
version of "Endgame" in Cambridge, and therefore entitle him to
judicial relief.
Such an argument is novel in this context. Traditionally, unfair
competition has been used as a complement to copyright. It has been
frequently used to protect titles or the uncopyrightable subject mat-
ter of an author's works. Since the copyright extends to the creative
contents of a work, and not the title, 1 a method of protection is nec-
essary to ensure that the good will created in a title by advertising
and popularity is not wrongfully appropriated.
A title may be protected through the doctrine of unfair competi-
tion, but only when it has acquired a secondary meaning in the public
mind such that the public associates the title with the particular prod-
uct."2 Alexander Lindey explains the doctrine as follows:
The doctrine of unfair competition comes into play when a title has ac-
quired a "secondary significance." This occurs when a work or phrase
has become so closely associated in the public mind with, say, a story,
that whenever the title is mentioned, the man-in-the-street will think it
refers to the story. Whether a title has been sufficiently linked in the
public mind with a specific work to warrant the law's protection is a
question of fact, depending in the main on the popularity the work has
enjoyed.63
In Warner Brothers Pictures, Inc. v. Majestic Pictures" for example, a
movie studio was enjoined from using the title "Gold Diggers of
Paris" because the name "Gold Diggers" had come to mean the play
by Avery Hopwood and the film "Gold Diggers of Broadway."6 No
other film producer was allowed to gain the advantage of the title's
value, and Warner Brothers' investment was protected.
Even if the original play was not successful, use of the title may be
protected. The watchwords are "association" and "confusion," not
competition. In Jackson v. Universal International Pictures, Inc.66 a play
entitled "Slightly Scandalous" which rehearsed in Los Angeles later
opened in Philadelphia to negative reviews. The production per-
sisted, however, and moved to New York City for a run of seven
61. Becker v. Loew's Inc., 133 F.2d 889 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 772 (1943).
62. Becker v. Loew's Inc., 133 F.2d 889 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 319 U.S. 772, (1943);
Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc. 119 F.
Supp. 209 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 221 F.2d 464 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
832 (1954).
63. A. Lindey, Model Forms for the Arts 1058-59 (1987).
64. 70 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1934).
65. Id. at 311.
66. 36 Cal. 2d 116, 222 P.2d 433 (1950).
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poorly attended performances before finally closing. Two years later,
Universal released a film under the title "Slightly Scandalous," but
which otherwise had nothing to do with Jackson's play."
Expert witnesses testified for Jackson explaining the role a poor
production may ultimately have in the market. Arguing in favor of
the old maxim that "any press is good press," one expert explained
that "some of the most successful pictures have been made of plays
that have been flops."" The court found that although the play was
not successful, the Broadway run and press coverage incidental to the
production were sufficient to protect the author's interest in the title
of his work.
Popularity is not a requirement for secondary meaning because notori-
ety and adverse discussion may bring about widespread identification of
the play by its title and may pique the public interest. Likewise, advertis-
ing, even of an unpopular play, may cause the public to identify it as one
which has been a "Broadway production." 9
The result is that a playwright is not constrained by having to
prove that he has created a "successful" production, only that he has
created a "memorable" play. All the playwright need argue is that as
a result of the changes, the new production would diminish the op-
portunity to market the play as the author intended. Because, if suc-
cessful, a plaintiff can obtain injunctive relief as well as damages,"'
the action is in many ways as powerful as a copyright infringement.
Titles and subject matter are not the only artistic elements that can
be protected by a successful claim of unfair competition. As the court
suggested in Lugosi v. Universal Pictures Co.," the personality of an
actor may be commercially marketable and entitled to protection
through an unfair competition action.7 ' Additionally, in Burt Lahr v.
Adell Chemical Co.,7 3 the court found that the comic Burt Lahr had a
cause of action against the company when it unfairly pirated his
unique style of performance.
Whether a court would be willing to extend the doctrine of unfair
competition and apply it to cases of improper or changed perform-
ances remains to be seen. Such an extension of the doctrine could
become problematic. How improper or objectionable must a produc-
67. Id. at 120, 222 P.2d at 435.
68. Id. at 119, 222 P.2d at 435.
69. Id. at 122, 222 P.2d at 437.
70. A. Lindey, supra note 63, at 1059.
71. 160 Cal. Rptr. 323, 603 P.2d 425 (1979).
72. Id. at 326, 603 P.2d at 428.
73. 300 F.2d 256 (1st Cir. 1962).
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tion be before the court feels compelled to award damages? In the
Beckett situation, would the casting of a black performer in a role
previously requiring a white performer (and "raising the issue of mis-
cegenation") 74 be sufficient in and of itself to warrant judicial relief?.
Would the use of unauthorized music be a second and self-sufficient
offense, or would the nature of the deviation have to be so egregious
that only the worst of interpretative manipulation could create a suc-
cessful cause of action?
The simple extension of such a remedy could lead to an action for
damages whenever legitimate artistic decisions (such as casting) were
made without sufficient insight such that the resulting production be-
came an artistic failure. One can envisage a new judicial doctrine, the
"reasonable critic standard," based on the common law reasonable
person standard. Under this standard, damages would only be availa-
ble when reasonable theatre critics could not disagree that a better
artistic decision was available. It seems probable that if the judiciary
did become involved at this level, a defense to the unfair competition
might develop known as the "director's judgment rule."' "7 The stan-
dard would be that if a director were to make an informed decision
which a reasonably prudent director would make, then he could not
be held liable for his mistake of judgment. The combination of the
"reasonable critic standard" and the "director's judgment rule"
would mean that only decisions which would obviously destroy a pro-
duction could be precluded. In the "Endgame" scenario, there is a
possibility that the cause of action would be available, but the fact
pattern does not seem to support it. Then again, it is possible that a
judge may feel the decision to include music by Philip Glass is just the
type of decision which should entitle the author to a judicial
remedy.76
74. Freedman, supra note 34.
75. This rule is based on the familiar "business judgment rule" of the law of corpora-
tions. "[One] cannot secure the aid of the court to correct what appears to them to be mis-
takes of judgment on the part of the officers. This rule applies whether the mistake is
due to an error of fact or of law, or merely to bad business judgment." Ashwander v. T.V.A.,
297 U.S. 288, 343 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
"[The business judgment] rule rests on the theory that the board of directors had been
elected to make the business judgments of the corporation. These judgments should not be
usurped by an individual shareholder or the courts unless the board of directors has not
exercised its judgment in good faith." Issner v. Aldrich, 254 F. Supp. 696, 700 (D. Del.
1966).
76. This may be an unfair comment to the named composer, but under such a standard
precisely this issue would be litigated. To prove his case, Beckett would have to attack every
questionable decision the director made. The quality and applicability of the Glass music
would become a triable issue in the case.
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If the legal doctrines were to mirror those of corporate law as sug-
gested, the prophylactic requirements of informed judgments and
other procedural requirements would not be helpful in the search for
effective standards. They could only serve to handicap the director's
ability to make his often intuitive decisions, and would force him to
seek the opinions of "experts," further diluting his artistic autonomy.
This solution is problematic not only because the hypothetical legal
doctrines border on the ridiculous, but because the role of judge is
elevated to that of art critic. A judge is no longer asked to decide the
legal rights to the piece of material. Instead he is asked to weigh the
aesthetic merits of the artistic work and decide what decisions suffi-
ciently change the original work or affect an audience. There are no
legal precedents detailing the legal ramifications of a casting decision
on the ownership of the production rights. Such a result would force
the judicial system to make decisions it has long sought to avoid.
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the the
law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictoral illustra-
tions, outside the narrowest and most obvious limits. At the one ex-
treme, some works of genius would be sure to miss appreciation. Their
very novelty would make them repulsive until the public had learned
the new language in which the author spoke."
Such a solution would inevitably create far more problems than it
solved. The judiciary is not the appropriate forum to decide the
merit of artistic decisions, no matter what legal doctrines are used to
insulate the artist.
3. The Effectiveness of Section 43(a)
Another potential cause of action can be created under section
43(a) of the Lanham Act, which provides that
any person who shall . . . use in connection with any goods or services
a false designation of origin, or any false description or representa-
tion, including words or other symbols tending falsely to describe or re-
present the same . . . shall be liable to . . . any person who believes
that he is or is likely to be damaged by the use of any such false descrip-
tion or representation."
This federal statute may have sufficient breadth to reach non-con-
forming productions, but any plaintiff will face the same problem as
with an unfair competition claim. Once a judge or jury is called in to
determine if there has been an infringement, any decision will be
77. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903).
78. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982).
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based on an analysis of the production's merit, rather than the own-
ership of production rights. Further, section 43(a) has some hurdles
which may make it even less effective as a tool to protect the author
than the state law claim of unfair competition discussed above.
At its core, section 43(a) is designed to protect against selling goods
through misrepresentation or false implication. The falsehood need
not be explicitly stated, only inferred. 9 Further, it requires establish-
ment of likelihood of confusion or actual confusion. 0 A claim would
then fail where the theatre in fact told the whole truth about its pro-
duction. If in a production of "Sweet Charity," Bob Fosse's choreog-
raphy was not used, there is no injury when the program says "Cho-
reographed by Jan Meredith." It may even be appropriate for the
program to say "Originally Choreographed by Bob Fosse." Both
statements are true and neither should mislead the audience. For the
dancers who professionally recreate former shows, a prominent note
in the program such as "Original Choreography by Bob Fosse repro-
duced by Jan Meredith" may be enough to defeat any claims of false
description. It can be argued that such a note would falsely imply
that Fosse had something to do with the production, but Fosse's
choreography is in the show. The language of section 43(a) calls for
false designation or false description.8" An honest, forthright taking
of the choreography seems beyond the scope of the act.
The Second Circuit, however, in Perfect Fit Industries v. Acme Quilt-
ing Co.8" looked differently at the intent of the defendant.
In assessing the likelihood of confusion to the public, an important fac-
tor is whether or not the second comer created the similar [item] inten-
tionally. If there was intentional copying the second comer will be pre-
sumed to have intended to create a confusing similarity of appearance
and will be presumed to have succeeded.8
In the case of reproducing a choreographer's work, however, it
should not be an automatic assumption that the copier intended to
create confusion. This assumption may make intuitive sense in mar-
keting, but as stated above, the goal of the copier may be to make
perfectly clear that copying has occurred. If this assumption were
maintained in a choreography suit, the choreographer may be able to
establish that the reproduction was intended to be confusingly simi-
79. See Co-Rect Prods. v. Marvyl Advertising Photography, Inc., 780 F.2d 1324 (8th Cir.
1986).
80. Id. at 1329-30.
81. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982).
82. 618 F.2d 950 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 832 (1982).
83. Id. at 954.
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lar. The assumption does not fit the business practice, however, and
it will be hard to find a Des Moines audience member who read the
notice and thought Fosse was in town choreographing the
production.
For the author fighting modification of his play, section 43(a) pro-
vides little statutory support. If the producer's or director's name is
equally prominent on the billing and advertising, the combination of
names will create an inference fundamentally different than that of
the author's name alone. Knowing nothing else, seeing an advertise-
ment for The New World Vision Theatre production of "Broadway
Bound" would probably tell the potential audience that this produc-
tion is not going to be the same as the Neil Simon Theatre produc-
tion of the same show. A claim that the novel production created a
false impression that the play was like the production on Broadway,
when in fact the productions were quite dissimilar, will be very hard
to substantiate. Unless the theatre truly makes such a false statement
or actively misrepresents itself, such a claim is better left not
brought. Section 43(a) cannot be extended into this area without
some more traditional misrepresentation being alleged.
Section 43(a) has become a source of protection for titles under the
theory that the same title would tend to confuse the public and lead
it to believe an advertisement is for one story when in reality it is for
another.8" In fact, if the concept of interpretation is accepted as a
trade practice, (and it seems to be)85 then there can be no potential
confusion when a play is presented in a slightly different form than it
was produced on Broadway. It should not confuse the public when
they receive what they have come to expect. A presentation of Mere-
dith Wilson's "The Music Man" using the title "Death of a Sales-
man" would give rise to a section 43(a) action. If the setting were
changed from 1912 rural Iowa to 1987 Des Moines, no action would
lie.
Rather than looking to protection through the trade and business
practice notions of section 43(a), more traditional protection can be
found under the Copyright Act. Unfair competition and section 43(a)
provide some additional protection, but they do not address the un-
derlying balance of interests among artists. It is copyright that gives
protection to the original expression of all the artists involved in a
play's production. Once the parties know what elements they can
claim as their own, they can attempt to negotiate a contract which
84. See J. McCarthy, Trademarks & Unfair Competition § 10:5, at 339 (2d ed. 1984).
85. See Gussow, supra note 32.
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balances the economics and the artistic necessities of their
relationship.
III. Solving the Problem: Contracting a Compromise
A. Professional Contracts
For Samuel Beckett, the existence of copyright protection may
have been sufficient authority to win his suit. Beckett's writing style is
unique, however, in a manner which separates him from normal the-
atrical practice. All of the violations charged by Beckett in ART's
production of "Endgame" were to his own work. Beckett is meticu-
lous in his description of staging, characters and movement, but this
is not standard practice. Mel Gussow, critic for the New York Times
wrote that "[wlhile dialogue might be considered sacrosanct, direc-
tions are usually treated as suggestions rather than commands from
the author."'8 The process of shaping a production calls for many
changes in what becomes a very collaborative process.8" Remunera-
tion for the vast majority of individuals who contribute to the final
product comes from their weekly salaries. They own no future
rights88 and receive only what the original creators deem to give
them, usually a far smaller figure than would be required under a
royalty agreement.89
The standard theatrical practice is to have a stage manager write
down the stage directions as they develop throughout the rehearsal
stages of a production. The stage manager does not create the direc-
tions alone. They evolve through the interaction of actors and direc-
tor.90 The involvement of the author may range from very active to
86. Id.
87. NETC, supra note 9 (statement of Jack Lee). See also Gussow, supra note 32:
The playwright may see the stage in his mind's eye and may even describe it in his
script, but when the play goes into production a stage designer is employed to set
the scene. Where there is a door, he may prefer a window. Walls may become
transparent and, for the sake of a quick scene change, a park bench may appear in
a parlor.
88. The most notable exception is that of Jerome Robbins' involvement in "Fiddler on
the Roof." The result of that collaboration is a warning on the rented copies of the libretto
which allows for no changes in the choreography. All theatres must therefore attempt to re-
create precisely the original work. In this way, the creator is being rewarded for his efforts.
89. See Note, Collaboration in Theater: Problems and Copyright Solutions, 33 UCLA L.
Rev. 891 (1986).
90. Once the production is on the stage, the stage manager becomes its field com-
mander. The responsibility of the performance is in his hands. He starts each per-
formance, gives all cues, calls the actors, and posts all daily calls. He is charged with
maintaining production standards set by the director and company discipline
onstage.
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non-existent. The APC allows for the author's presence throughout
the rehearsal period.91 If anyone were to have rights to these
changes, the Dramatists Guild assumes it would be the author. In the
APC it is agreed that "Producer warrants that any change of any
kind whatsoever in the manuscript, title, stage business or perform-
ance of the Play made by Producer or any third party and which is
acceptable to Author shall be the property of Author." '92 Therefore,
it is the author who owns the rights to these artistic endeavors of the
theatre company. The Dramatists Guild is concerned with protection
of authors. As a result, the contract they have promulgated ensures
that their members retain all authority over productions.
The position of the Society of Stage Directors and Choreographers
is somewhat different. In section 10 of the Society contract with the
League of New York Theatres and Producers, Inc., "the Society
agrees that this contract . . . [does] not vest in any Director or Chor-
eographer the right to participate in any of the subsidiary rights of
the dramatist or Producer."9 " This clause, with the non-exclusive list
W. Parker & H. Smith, Scene Design and Stage Lighting 289 (4th ed. 1979).
91. APC § 8.02(a): "Author shall have the right to attend all rehearsals and perform-
ances of the Play prior to the Official Press Opening in New York City."
92. APC § 8.01(b).
93. Contract between the Society of Stage Directors and Choreographers and the League
of New York Theaters and Producers, Inc., at 12 [hereinafter Society-League Contract]. This
contract incorporates a letter agreement of Mar. 16, 1962, written by Erwin Feldman, coun-
sel for the Society. The letter reads as follows:
Dear Martin [Shumlin];
This will confirm the action which was unanimously ratified at the general mem-
bership meeting of the Society last Wednesday evening. The Society accepted the
proposals on the points which we discussed, which were as follows:
1. That the Society will not in any contract which may result from negotiations
between the League and the Society and any renewal of such contract for a period
of no less than twenty years, demand as a condition be included [sic] in any such
negotiated minimum basic agreement.
(a) Any provision which would give to any director or choreographer participa-
tion in any of the subsidiary rights of the dramatists and/or producers.
(b) Any condition which would change the present relations between producer,
director and dramatist as practiced in the New York legitimate theatre in connec-
tion with the duty, authority and control of any production.
2. That for membership in the Society, the Constitution and By-Laws will provide
that no initiation fee will exceed $100.
It is, of course, understood that the provisions of par. 1. shall in no way be construed to
prevent any director or choreographer from negotiating with and obtaining from any pro-
ducer, better terms without limitation, than are contained in any minimum form agreement
between the Society and the League.
Very truly yours,
SOCIETY OF STAGE DIRECTORS AND
CHOREOGRAPHERS, INC.
(signed) ERWIN FELDMAN, Counsel
300 COLUMBIA-VLA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS [Vol. 12:277
of subsidiary rights included in section 10(d) of the agreement 9 '
should act to prevent the Society from negotiating subsidiary-rights
agreements, allowing the producer to fulfill the promise made in the
APC that all changes are the property of the author.
There is one problem, however, with this contractual solution. Sec-
tion 6(c), under the heading "conditions of employment," explains
that while this agreement precludes the Society from further negotia-
tion, "[alnything contained in this Agreement or the schedule at-
tached hereto shall not be construed to prevent any Director or
Choreographer from negotiating with and obtaining from any Pro-
ducer any better terms and conditions."" Even under the existing
documents, a director can try to opt out of the no-subsidiary-rights
section of the contract. If a producer is not careful, he could give
both the director and author the same authority over the new, copy-
rightable material.9 6
The producer may still be protected, however, even if the con-
tracts did not have actual agreements on the subsidiary rights issue.
The producer could argue that a director creating copyrightable ma-
terial through his stage work was acting in the normal course of em-
ployment and that the work-for-hire doctrine is applicable.97 The
94. Id.
95. Id. at 6.
96. Careful contracting can be used to protect either side. In negotiating the subsidiary
rights elements of a contract, a producer can protect himself by requiring the parties to agree
that the director's original material is a work made for hire. Section 101 of the 1976 Act
defines a work made for hire as:
a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective
work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a
supplementary work, as a compilation,. . . if the parties expressly agree in a writ-
ten instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for
hire. For the purpose of the forgoing sentence, a "supplementary work" is a work
prepared for publication as a secondary adjunct to a work by another author for
the purpose of introducing, concluding, illustration, explaining, revising, comment-
ing upon, or assisting in the use of the other works, such as forewords, afterwords,
pictorial illustrations, maps, charts, tables, editorial notes, musical arrangements
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
If the material is a work made for hire, copyright vests in the employer. Id. § 201(b).
Assuming that stage direction will fall within this definition, a fairly negotiated agreement
between director and producer can give the producer copyright ownership.
97. Under the 1976 Act, "the employer or other person for whom the work as prepared
is considered the author ...and, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a
written instrument signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright." Id.
§ 201(b). In interpreting this section, however, courts have looked to the substance of the
hiring agreements to protect authors who have created independently from signing away
their copyright ownership through work-for-hire agreements.
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court will look to whether the work was within the regular scope of
employment, 98 to the pay arrangement and to the level of supervision
the employer actually demonstrated.99
If the director or an actor claims that what he has brought to a
playwright's character is sufficiently original to be copyrighted, he
may be able to overcome a work-for-hire presumption and "own" his
characterization of the performance. If such characterization is not
copyrightable, there is, of course, no issue. If instead, the playwright
has the control as Beckett contends, then he must be very careful
that the producer maintains a legitimate work-for-hire relationship
with all other creators throughout the process.
Taking Nimmer's analysis to be correct as to the legitimacy of
copyrighting stage business,10 0 as a result of the current contractual
development, it is apparent that a Dramatists Guild author or an au-
thor who uses a similar contractual provision has legal title to all the
modifications that resulted from the rehearsal process. As exclusive
owner of those rights, it seems probable that an author can make any
contractual arrangement which arms-length bargaining will allow.
For Samuel Beckett, this means that his suit would have been won or
lost, not because of the copyright statute, but because of his negotia-
tions with Samuel French (the play distributor) and ART.'
B. Contracts Outside the Guild, League and Society Arrangements
In the pre-Broadway situation, a play will often be presented by a
not-for-profit theatre for the artistic interest in promoting new play-
wrights. In such situations there may be no pay involved, and often
the contracting, if existent, is quite uninclusive. Assuming again that
the Nimmer analysis is accurate and that copyright will serve to pro-
tect the stage directions, there is still a great risk that the use of con-
tracts may not prove a viable solution.' 02
98. Murray v. Gelderman, 566 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1978) (withdrawing previous opinion
and granting rehearing).
99. Evans Newton Inc., v. Chicago Sys. Software, 793 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1986); Aldon
Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel Inc. 738 F.2d 548 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984).
100. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
101. Samuel French, the theatrical publishing company and licensing agent, licensed the
play to ART. It was not Samuel French that sought to enjoin the production, however, but
Barney Rosset, the president of Grove Press. Rosset is the theatrical agent of Mr. Beckett,
and Grove Press is the American publisher of Beckett's works. See supra note 34. It is there-
fore possible that Samuel French had no contractual objection to ART's interpretation of the
play because the agreement between the two publishers did not clarify the issue.
102. A director or performer may claim copyright of his collaborative elements in the
production, and by his early association ensure himself a percentage of future finances from
1988]
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As a first step, a playwright should be sure to include in any agree-
ment between the playwright and producer, a clause similar to the
clause quoted from the APC that in exchange for the rights to per-
form the script, the producer agrees that any interest he receives as a
result of the production in new copyrightable material is exclusively
granted to the author. A clause such as this should accompany any
agreement which gives the theatre company a financial interest in the
future of the play. The exchange is a hope for future revenue in re-
turn for belief in the author's ability and respect for the author's
right to create his own final product.
Similarly, the playwright should have an agreement with the actor
that in exchange for the value of being cast in the new production
and the possible exposure that will result from taking such a role, the
actor agrees that any interest he receives in new copyrightable mate-
rial as a result of the production is exclusively granted to the author.
Such contracts will help to ensure that the author will at least have an
initial opportunity to protect his work and maintain artistic control
while he is involved.
Contract agreements employing such language should be enforcea-
ble. If the agreements include an interest in future earnings or pro-
ductions, there is clearly sufficient consideration to show the con-
tracts are fair and equitable. Even absent a financial agreement,
consideration of a valuable opportunity in exchange for intellectual
property should be valid."0 8
Individual contracts are necessary between each actor and the au-
thor because it is likely that the actors will not be covered by the
work-for-hire doctrine as either creators of commissioned work or as
employees of the theatre or the author. To be a commissioned work,
there would have to be a contract to that effect.'" To prove that the
actors were employees, there must be evidence of that relation-
ship. 0 5 Any proof of employment would indicate that the director
was the employer, not the theater or the author.
the script. This may be an equitable solution in some situations, such as that described in the
UCLA note detailing the development of A Chorus Line, but should only be allowed to de-
velop through the full understanding of all the parties and not because of the innocence of
the author or subtlety of a director. See Note, supra note 89.
103. As an example of a non-financial enforceable contract see Schumm v. Berg, 37 Cal.
2d 174, 231 P.2d 39 (1959). Here, actor Wallace Beery was found to have been given consid-
eration for his promise of child support because the mother promised in exchange to name
the child Wallace if a boy or Wally if a girl. See generally E.A. Farnsworth, Contracts § 2.5
(4th ed. 1982).
104. See supra notes 96-97.
105. "[l1f an employer supervised and directed the work, an employer-employee relation-
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A contractual solution to decide who owns the rights to the differ-
ent elements in the initial production is still problematic on the prag-
matic level. The nature of not-for-profit theatre, workshops and the
other forms of play development militate against any solution which
increases the need for documentation and paper work. Careful con-
tracting may be effective, but until a court squarely decides the
copyrightability of stage directions, it will be difficult to put into
practice. The authors and producers who are most in need of these
agreements are often the very people who are without the resources
to utilize them. Were the court to find that more than mere stage
directions, movement, timing and casting need be involved to give an
independent copyright, then the beginning author could feel fairly
safe that his work will not become entangled with anyone he does not
wish to become involved.
IV. The Industry Standard: In Search of Interpretation
Until a court decides the minimum level of originality and input
necessary to create a separate copyright action, there will be no satis-
factory solution to the conflict. The only way to stop the "Endgame"
situation from recurring is for the author to contract around the
problem. Because of the standardization with which most plays are
distributed to amateur companies, there should be a single position
which is considered the industry norm, and any deviation from this
standard should be clearly marked in the agreement and on the indi-
vidual copies of the scripts.
What the standard industry position should be is a question of hot
debate. At the New York University panel discussion entitled "Au-
thors versus Directors"1 '6 arguments for both author's absolute con-
trol and for liberal license to interpret were adamantly propounded.
Speaking on behalf of the playwright, John Guare" 7 suggested that
ship could be found even though the employee was not a regular or formal employee." Al-
don Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel Inc., 738 F.2d 548, 552 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 982
(1984. In Aldon Accessories, the Second Circuit held that the Japanese and Taiwanese sculp-
tors of porcelain and brass statuettes were employees because the company which contracted
with them had an individual who "actively supervised and directed the creation of both the
porcelain and brass statuettes. While he did not physically wield the sketching pen and sculpt-
ing tools, he stood over the artisans at critical stages of the process, telling them exactly what
to do." Id. at 553. Under such a standard, the director may well be the "employer" and
therefore claim rights in the performances of the actors. It is far more difficult to allow the
theater to take the credit, unless the director is the employee of the theater as well.
106. Sponsored by the Tisch School of the Arts Undergraduate Drama Dept. (Mar. 12,
1985).
107. Author of "Landscape of the Body."
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"[t]heater is a collaborative art . . . but the playwright can choose
who he or he wants to collaborate with." 108 Disagreeing, the set de-
signer of "Endgame," Douglas Stein, said a "process of creative
thinking begins when the rights to a play are given to a theatre. And
it is wrong to censor that.""'
The argument for greater interpretation and access is not a new
one. The Drama League of America espoused the need for greater
availability for amateur productions as follows: "Our civilization is
suffering from over-specialization in art, from too much professional-
ism. In spite of the general increase in culture, the actual practice of
any of the arts seems to be rather less general, in our own time, than
in former days."110 This commentary on the need for amateur thea-
ter, written in 1914, remains valid today as a reason to favor greater
access for amateur companies. The Drama League recognized the
value of what has grown to be community theater. "There must be,
first, a nucleus of amateur actors-young people, or old, or
both-willing to work and to experiment seriously .... "" This ar-
gument for interpretation, however, is not without its detractors.
Jerry Herman, in an unpublished article, asks: "[W]hy doesn't every-
one else connected with the theatre demand equal rights with Com-
posers and Lyricists?"'1 2 He concludes that the only artists who do
not suffer from the dilution of artistic integrity are the lyricist and
108. Quoted in Freedman, supra note 35.
109. Id.
110. Drama League of America, supra note 28.
111. Id.
112. Jerry Herman, "Golly Gee Fellas" (unpublished comments written in late 1963)
(available at the Lincoln Center Branch of the New York Public Library, clippings file,
Copyright-Theatre-U.S.).
For a clear picture of how marvelously unfair it all is, take a look at Bobby Book-
writer. His scenes served as the inspiration, the starting place, yes sometimes even
the title for a musical number. But guess who rakes in the income on all those
records of all those songs inspired by all his scenes? ...
When we go out of town and a new scene is needed, the choreographer, the set
and costume designer are all naked, helpless, and must start from scratch. Bit [sic]
the sneaky songwriter flips open his trunk pulls out that ballad that was cut from
the last trip to Philadelphia, or that piece of patter he wrote for his college varsity
show, and he's in business ....
Let's examine what happens to a musical a decade after its final Broadway cur-
tain. The Walla-Walla Music Tent opens its summer season with a big Met star in
the title role. Of course, she's never acted before, so the book is cut to ribbons, the
only things resembling choreography she is able to face is a Gavotte she once did in
"Marriage of Figaro" so ... she does the Gavotte. Those award winning sets, once
the talk of Broadway, have been replaced by canvas, rigging and an audience in the
round and the costumes have been salvaged from the afore-mentioned production
of Figaro . . ..
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the composer. All other elements (script, scenery and direction) are
all equally maimed by post-Broadway productions. 1" To the extent
Mr. Herman accurately portrays the problem, however, his argument
does not support the author over the director and other artists. In-
terpretation may sometimes help non-Broadway productions. Accord-
ing to Mr. Herman, everything else hurts them.1 4
More than just the philosophical question of artistic license or artis-
tic integrity is at issue. The licensing house Tams-Whitmark, well-
known for its collection of Broadway musicals, suggests that there is
not a need to offer playwrights better protection. They have no pro-
ductions which require the theatre to use the suggested setting or
stage directions and have no authors who request this be changed.
Additionally, if there is not a great demand, there will not be a great
enforcement of any rule limiting the creative efforts of amateur per-
formances. An established rule rarely enforced may be more damag-
ing than no rule except for the occasional special contract.
Finally, it must be remembered that although the problem is real
and can be troublesome, most artists are pragmatic. If the Duluth
Playhouse pays the royalties, the income will allow the author to keep
writing for the next Broadway attempt. The Duluth designer receives
his chance at a new artistic challenge and the adoration of the city
while the Arizona playwright (unsure which state Duluth is in) re-
ceives his payment, and self-sufficient because of the amateur-rights
income, he has the opportunity to write the next winner of the Outer
Circle Award. If he is successful enough that the amateur-rights in-
come no longer affects his opportunity to continue writing, he can
probably find a publisher who will exercise the necessary authority
over his play so that it is only done in accordance with his wishes. By
having the industry standard favor interpretation, audience, author,
performer, director and designer are all given room to exercise their
art.
CONCLUSION
The problem of artistic interpretation is a real one. Without a clear
legal determination regarding the degree to which a play can be in-
terpreted by amateur, regional and touring productions, small com-
panies will continue to be discouraged from experimentation. The
law must be clear so that the threat of litigation is not a tool used to
stop new, interpretative theater. The need for interpretation, how-
113. Id.
114. Id.
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ever, should not be used as the excuse for altering the work of the
author and changing his play into something with which he would
not want his name associated. The only way to create a balance be-
tween these conflicting needs is to begin with some generally ac-
cepted principle on what a playwright licenses when the performance
rights are given. Dialogue is to be considered sacrosanct, but stage
directions should be treated as suggestions, not commands. From this
basic formulation, authors can contract with the various theaters and
directors for greater control. In this way, a playwright will be in-
volved in the more tightly controlled productions from the begin-
ning, the rest of the theatrical community will not be constrained
from the fear of litigation, and the needs of all the artists will be
protected. As a result, playwrights, directors and everyone else in-
volved in the collective process of drama will benefit from the tension
created by interpretation.
Samuel Beckett, however, may not agree.
